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"If Sex Offenders Can Marry, Then Why Not
Gays and Lesbians?": An Essay on the
Progressive Comparative Argument
COURTNEY MEGAN CAHILLt

One of the criticisms commonly leveled by progressive
and conservative commentators alike at those who advocate
for same-sex marriage is that the movement is decidedly
imitative. For instance, in 1993, feminist academic
Professor Nancy Polikoff characterized the lesbian and gay
community's "desire to marry" as "an attempt to mimic the
worst of mainstream society."' More recently, conservative

t Associate Professor of Law, Roger Williams University, School of Law. Ph.D.,
Princeton University; J.D., Yale Law School; B.A., Barnard College, Columbia
University. I would like to thank the School of Law at Roger Williams
University for graciously providing the financial assistance necessary to
complete this Essay, Germaine Gurr for her predictably illuminating thoughts
and suggestions on this piece, and the faculty at the University of Toledo,
College of Law, where an early version of this Essay was presented.
1. Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For. Why Legalizing Gay and
Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantlethe Legal Structure of Gender in Every
Marriage," 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (1993). For other commentators who have
considered the extent to which current marriage equality discourse has come to
echo or replicate conservative marriage idiom and the image of marriage that
that idiom projects, see Lisa Duggan, The New Homonormativity: The Sexual
Politics of Neoliberalism, in MATERIALIZING DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A REVITALIZED
CULTURAL POLITICS 175, 187-88 (Russ Castronovo & Dana D. Nelson eds., 2002)
(stating that the neoliberal marriage rhetoric championed by Andrew Sullivan
and others projects a "role for marriage" that "sound[s] an awful lot like the
dangerous mixture of 'moral education, psychotherapy and absolution"' that has
long marked conservative marriage idiom, and criticizing Sullivan in particular
for adopting a purely imitative conception of marriage as, in his words, the
"mirror image of the happy heterosexuality I imagined around me"); Katherine
M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex MarriagePolitics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 236, 246-47 (2006) (stating that "enough of the arguments" recently deployed
by same-sex marriage advocates "echo[ ] a longing for a kind of contemporary
coverture, whereby one or both previously individuated subjects are dissolved
into a joint legal and economic unit by and through the institution of
marriage"); Suzanna Danuta Walters, Wedding Bells and Baby Carriages:
HeterosexualsImagine Gay Families, Gay FamiliesImagine Themselves, in THE
USES OF NARRATIVE: EXPLORATIONS IN SOCIOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND CULTURAL
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author, columnist, and same-sex marriage opponent, Shelby
Steele, remarked that "[t]he true problem with gay
marriage is that it consigns gays to a life of mimicry and
pathos. '2 Strange bedfellows, commentators like Polikoff
and Steele are drawn together by a common idiom of
imitation, one that advocates on both sides of the ideological
same-sex marriage divide have turned to as a way of
characterizing not only same-sex marriage but also the
imitative structure of certain legal strategies on which
sexual minorities
have relied in order to secure equal
3
marital rights.
Whether the push for marriage equality is hopelessly
imitative, and thus normatively undesirable, is a question
on which this Essay remains largely agnostic. Its principal
focus, rather, is on the imitative structure of a particular
rhetorical strategy on which those who support same-sex
marriage have recently relied when making arguments for
why same-sex marriage prohibitions are unconstitutional.
Specifically, supporters have increasingly invoked a
comparative argument that shares many of the structural
and substantive features of the slippery slope, a disgusttriggering mechanism and a long time favorite of marriage
traditionalists who hysterically presage that same-sex
marriage will lead the Nation precipitously into incest and

STUDIES 48, 54 (Molly Andrews et al. eds., 2004) (stating that marriage might

emerge from the same-sex marriage movement as "a hierarchy of intimacy that
replicates the heterosexual one, rather than challenging or altering it"). For an
opposing view, see Mae Kuykendall, Resistance to Same-Sex Marriage as a
Story About Language: Linguistic Failure and the Priority of a Living
Language, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 390 (1999) ("Gay marriage speech is
sincere and is not in any rigorous sense 'mimicry' of heterosexual marriage
speech."); Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for
Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 567, 587 (1995) ("What many gay people do not want is an all-ornothing model imposed on their lesbian or gay identity; they want both to be
gay and married, to be gay and part of the larger society. For these lesbians and
gay men, being gay is not just about being different, it is also about being equal.
Their deeply-held convictions about how they want to live their lives and
liberation are not mere mimicry. They are entitled to respect within our
community as well as by the state.").
2. Shelby Steele, Selma to San Francisco?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2004, at
A16.
3. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the
Ethics of Representation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 115
(David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
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other disgust-inducing taboos.
The comparative argument, which this Essay will
analyze in greater depth below, goes something like this: if
even sex offenders may marry, then why not gays and
lesbians? This progressive argument is comparative
because it considers a morally inferior group, sex offenders,
relative to one that is morally superior to it, gays and
lesbians. 5 Moreover, this argument is predicated on notions
of comparative worthiness because it assumes that group X,
sex offenders, that already enjoys the right to marry, is less
worthy than group Y, gays and lesbians, which does not.
Finally, the comparative worth argument is a kind of
reverse slippery slope because it assumes that the legal
recognition of those who are better (gays and lesbians) is
somehow logically compelled by the legal recognition of
those who are worse (sex offenders). A version of this
argument has been widely embraced by commentators who
support same-sex marriage and by those who advocate
for
6
same-sex marriage in marriage equality litigation.
That those who support and advocate for same-sex
marriage have come to rely on an argument that mimics,
whether consciously or not, the slippery slope is remarkable
given the extent to which that trope is so often deployed as
an argument against same-sex marriage. Equally remarkable
is the extent to which the progressive comparative
argument tends to trigger our moral outrage, and, at times,
our disgust-an illiberal sentiment traditionally associated
with reactionary elements in the same-sex marriage debate
and a human emotion of which sexual minorities have
historically been the unfortunate target.7 Indeed, how has it

4. For a survey of those arguments, see Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex
Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the Politics of Disgust: A Critical
Perspective on ContemporaryFamily Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1543, 1554-62 (2005); see also Eugene Volokh, Same-Sex Marriage and
Slippery Slopes, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1155 (2005).

5. The Oxford English Dictionaryprovides "comparative" as one definition of
"relative," and defines "relative" as "[a]rising from, depending on, or determined
by, relation to something else or to each other." OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
551 (2d ed. 1989). I should note that I am using "comparative," here and
throughout, in the sense of "relative" rather than in the sense of comparable or
roughly equal.
6. See infra Part I.B passim.
7. See Cahill, supra note 4, at 1577-1601.
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come to be that same-sex marriage liberals have
appropriated a most illiberal rhetoric and is this rhetorical
move either strategically or normatively desirable?
This Essay will consider three questions: (1) what is the
progressive comparative argument and which features does
it share with the slippery slope, (2) why have marriage
progressives increasingly used this argument in marriage
equality discourse, and (3) whether the argument is a good
idea. Part I will set forth the comparative argument as it
has appeared in a variety of legal sources, including
academic commentary, litigation briefs, and judicial
opinions, and will highlight the substantive and structural
similarities that the argument shares with the slippery
slope. Part II will then offer three different explanations for
why marriage progressives have increasingly turned to this
particular argument, notwithstanding its similarities to the
slippery slope and its disgust-inducing tendencies. Here,
this Essay will consider the potentially beneficial effects of
rhetorical mimicry or appropriation more generally. Part III
will finally argue that the progressive comparative
argument is both strategically counterproductive and
normatively undesirable, not least of which because it
promotes a decidedly thin vision of tolerance that
maintains, rather than rejects, a proper role for revulsion in
our legal order.
I. THE PROGRESSIVE COMPARATIVE ARGUMENT AND THE
CONSERVATIVE SLIPPERY SLOPE TROPE

This Part offers a survey of the progressive comparative
argument and highlights the features that it shares with
the slippery slope, a rhetorical trope which is itself a kind of
comparative disgust argument. Because this Essay
contends that the progressive comparative argument is an
imitation (specifically, a reverse form) of the conservative
slippery slope argument, a brief review of the structural
and substantive features of the slippery slope, and an
explanation of its comparative disgust function, is useful.
To that end, Subsection A will consider what the slippery
slope looks like and how it functions. Subsection B will then
provide a survey of the progressive comparative argument
as it has appeared in a variety of legal sources. Finally,
Subsection C will highlight the structural and substantive
similarities between the progressive comparative argument
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and its conservative forebear. This Subsection will also,
where relevant, highlight some of the differences between
these two arguments.
A. The Conservative Slippery Slope (or Comparative
Disgust)Argument
The slippery slope is a long-time rhetorical favorite of
marriage traditionalists who believe that same-sex
marriage will lead us inexorably into polygamy, incest, and
other sexual abominations. 8 In Bowers v. Hardwick,9 the
Supreme Court invoked the metaphor of the slope not in the
context of same-sex marriage but rather to portend the
world of sexual abandon that would result should the Court
find that a right to "homosexual conduct" existed under the
Constitution. 10 Shortly before the Supreme Court decided
Lawrence v. Texas," then-Senator Rick Santorum did the
same to presage the evils that would inevitably result
should the Supreme Court reverse Bowers (which of course
it did in Lawrence).12 Perhaps most famously, Justice Scalia
turned to slippery slope rhetoric in his Lawrence dissent to
bemoan the dissolution of the law's (and society's) moral
fabric that would, in his estimation, surely flow from
Lawrence and the majority's suggestion in that case that
majoritarian moral disapproval no longer constituted even
a legitimate state interest for laws that prohibited certain
conduct. 13
8. See id. at 1554-62; see also Ruth E. Sternglantz, Raining on the Paradeof
Horribles: Of Slippery Slopes, Faux Slopes, and Justice Scalia's Dissent in
Lawrence v. Texas, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1097-98 (2005); Volokh, supra note
4.

9. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
10. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195-96 ("[I]t would be difficult, except by fiat, to
limit the claimed right to homosexual conduct while leaving exposed to
prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes even though they are
committed in the home. We are unwilling to start down that road.").
11. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
12. Interview by the Associated Press with Sen. Rick Santorum (Apr. 7,
2003), available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-04-23santorum-excerpt~x.htm ("[I]f the Supreme Court says that you have the right
to consensual [gay] sex within your home, then you have the right to bigamy,
you have the right to polygamy, you have the right to incest, you have the right
to adultery. You have the right to anything.").
13. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If, as the Court
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The conservative invocation of the slippery slope in the
same-sex marriage debate constitutes a comparative
disgust argument for two interrelated reasons: (1) because
it sets up a comparative or relative hierarchy of unsavory
relationships; and (2) because it is a comparative argument
that triggers disgust. First, the slippery slope is
comparative in the sense that it sets up a hierarchy, albeit
a slippery one, of repulsive relationships on the slope, each
of which is either more or less disgusting relative to the
other. That is, those relationships which sit at the top of the
slope are, relatively speaking, less disgusting than those
into which we might plunge at the bottom-as well as those
which we might find. along the way. 14 Same-sex marriage,
which rests tentatively and precariously on the flat ground
at the top of the slope, most likely registers low on the
disgust scale as compared to, or relative to, the other
relationships which routinely appear below it (e.g., incest
and bestiality).
Second, and as I have argued in a previous article, the
rhetorical figure of the slippery slope is a powerful way to
convey disgust or revulsion over otherwise consensual
sexual relationships. 15 Because the slope is both downward
and slippery, it assumes that governmental recognition of
same-sex marriage will lead us tumbling down an incline
where we will encounter progressively more disgusting
relationships along the way, from polygamy, to incest, to
bestiality (and most likely in that order). Indeed, it is that
very (slippery) hierarchy of disgust that makes the slope
such an effective way to trigger fear-and, of course,
disgust-over something which, relatively or comparatively
speaking, might not be as disgusting as something else. For
instance, while same-sex marriage might not look at all like
incest, the conservative juxtaposition of same-sex marriage
with incest has the effect of triggering the disgust that we
asserts, the promotion of majoritarian sexual morality is not even a legitimate
state interest, none of the above-mentioned laws [e.g., criminal laws against
fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity] can
survive rational-basis review.").
14. For the structural features of the slippery slope, see Cahill, supra note 4,
at 1550-54; Eric Lode, Slippery Slope Arguments and Legal Reasoning, 87 CAL.
L. REV. 1469 (1999); Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARv. L. REV. 361
(1985); Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARv. L.
REV. 1026 (2003).

15. Cahill, supra note 4, at 1577.
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all feel when in the proximity of anything that brings us
closer to incest. The true ingenuity of the slippery slope,
then, is that it leaves us directing our disgust toward the
thing at the top that demands our immediate attention
(here, same-sex marriage) even as it forces us to recognize
that the thing at the bottom is worse. In this way, the
slippery and inexorable aspect of the slope tends to
undercut the comparative or relative aspect of the slope
because the former (i.e., the slope's slipperiness) suggests
that any and all attempts to maintain the latter (i.e., the
slope's comparative gradient) are virtually impossible.
Because conservative slippery slope arguments in the
marriage context have the tendency to collapse the
comparatively more disgusting things on them into each
other, they can be enormously effective from a strategic
perspective. For instance, cognitive scientists have shown
that political conservatives, unlike political liberals, exhibit
disgust over same-sex relationships. Both groups, however,
equally exhibit disgust, or what those scientists call "moral
dumbfounding," over incest. 16 By juxtaposing something
that we all agree is bad (incest) with something that only
some of us find morally objectionable (same-sex marriage),
the conservative slippery slope argument offers "an
opportune way of winning the debate over same-sex
marriage" because it alerts would-be same-sex marriage
supporters that "incest is disgusting and must therefore be
avoided at all costs-even if that means that [they] might
17
end up sacrificing a cause which they tend to support.'
B. The Progressive ComparativeArgument: A Survey
Marriage progressives have increasingly turned to a
kind of comparative argument that is structurally and
substantively similar to the conservative slippery slope or
comparative disgust argument. As mentioned in this Essay's
Introduction, the progressive comparative argument goes
something like this: It is irrational for the state to withhold
marriage from committed same-sex partners (or from gays
and lesbians more generally) because the state already
16. See Jonathan Haidt & Matthew A. Hersh, Sexual Morality: The Cultures
and Emotions of Conservatives and Liberals, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 191,
194 (2001).
17. Cahill, supra note 4, at 1577.
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allows all sorts of unsavory folks-people who are arguably
worse than those committed same-sex partners-to get
married. In the words of one commentator:
[W]e allow murderers and rapists (even those who have murdered
or raped previous spouses) to marry; we allow [pedophiles] and
child molesters to marry. We do not stop child abusers or. . . 'dead
beat dads' . . . from marrying. Sadists, masochists and fetishists
may marry and are not obliged to choose partners with similar
inclinations. People who are HIV-infected or suffer from AIDs [sic]
are allowed to marry. . . . Transvestites may marry . . . . And
transsexuals may marry so long as they marry someone of the
other gender from that which they themselves were born in ....
Should we then deny marriage to those
who wish to enter into
18
unions with a member of their own sex?

Legal scholar and staunch same-sex marriage advocate
Professor William Eskridge, Jr. has invoked comparative
rhetoric to make a somewhat similar argument, namely,
that the government need not approve of a couple's
"lifestyle" in order to extend it the right to marry, as the
government already extends marriage to a whole panoply of
individuals whose "lifestyle" it finds "deviant" and
distasteful. He says:
Convicted felons, divorced parents who refuse to pay child support,
delinquent taxpayers, fascists, and communists-all receive
marriage licenses from the state. The Supreme Court stands ready
to discipline any state that denies these citizens their right to
marry, yet no one believes that the license constitutes state
approval of felony, default on support obligations, tax delinquency,
communism, or fascism. People considered sexually deviant also
routinely get marriage licenses. Pedophiles, transvestites,
transsexuals, sadists, masochists, sodomites, and hermaphrodites
can get marriage licenses in every state-so long as they can
persuade the state that they are heterosexual pedophiles,
transvestites, transsexuals, sadists, masochists, sodomites, and
hermaphrodites (sometimes this is a pretty scholastic exercise).
Gay people constitute virtually the only group in America whose
members are not permitted to marry the partner they love. This is
intolerable. 19

18. M.D.A. Freeman, Not Such a Queer Idea: Is There a Case for Same Sex
Marriages?, 16 J. APPLIED PHIL. 1, 1-2 (1999).
19. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM
SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 12 (1996).
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Each of these pro-same-sex marriage arguments might
aptly be termed a comparative argument if we think about
"comparative" not necessarily in the sense of comparable or
roughly equal, but rather in the sense of "relative," that is,
"[a]rising from, depending on, or determined by, relation to
something else or to each other."20 Specifically, each
argument considers sexual minorities relative to others who
are either (1) presumably less, or at the very least equally,
marriage-worthy (e.g., murderers and rapists); or (2)
presumably more, or at the very least equally, sexually
deviant (e.g., sadists, masochists).
Numerous other commentators and public figures have
deployed a species of this argument to underscore the
flagrant inequity of withholding marriage from a group that
21
deserves it while extending it to a virtual "rogues' gallery" 22
of heterosexuals who, under their view, deserve it less.
20. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 551.

21. EVAN GERSTMANN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 28 (2004).
22. See, e.g., id. at 28, 34; JONATHAN GOLDBERG-HILLER, THE LIMITS TO
UNION: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE POLITICS OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2002); MARTHA
C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 201 (1999); Rev. Gregory Dell et al.,
Session One: Social, Cultural, and Philosophical Issues, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 1, 8 (2000) ("No comparable rights of others are violated by the

institution [of marriage] being made available to same-sex couples. To the
contrary . . . it seems quite telling of whose rights are being denied that

'heterosexual pedophiles, transvestites, transsexuals, sadists, masochists,
sodomites, and hermaphrodites' can get marriage licenses in every state but gay
people cannot." (quoting ESKRIDGE, supra note 19, at 12)); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Multivocal Prejudices and Homo Equality, 74 IND. L.J. 1085, 1119 (1999)
("The wildest, most beast-like heterosexual man is allowed to marry, and the
Supreme Court has held that even convicted murderers and rapists have a
presumptive right to marry."); Samuel A. Marcosson, The Lesson of the SameSex Marriage Trial: The Importance of Pushing Opponents of Lesbian and Gay
Rights to Their "Second Line of Defense," 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 721, 74041 (1996-1997) (commenting that Hawaii's stated interest for prohibiting samesex marriage, encouraging the optimal setting for parenting, lacks rationality
because "the State does not even prevent convicted, recidivist pedophiles from
marrying"); Mark Tanney, The Defense of Marriage Act: A "Bare Desire to
Harm" an Unpopular Minority Cannot Constitute a Legitimate Governmental
Interest, 19 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 99, 121 (1997) ('Immoral', 'depraved'
individuals committing 'abominations' frequently have the right to marry in
America. Rapists and child molesters have the right to marry. Convicted
murderers spending life in prison . . .have the right to marry."); Gina Farag,
Examining the Premises Behind the Anti-Gay Marriage Movement 3 (Feb. 16,
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.crossleft.org/files/Samesex%20Marriage%20IPC4(posted%2OFeb16).doc ("Certainly, committed, samesex relationships cannot be considered as bad as or worse than rape or child
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For instance, one commentator remarked that the
"encouraging the optimal setting for parenting" rationale
sometimes offered by states in support of same-sex marriage
prohibitions lacks rationality from a constitutional
perspective because "the State does not even prevent
convicted, recidivist pedophiles from marrying. ' 23 Similarly,
another commentator recently pronounced that if "[w]ifebeaters, rapists, pimps, and pornographers may wed with
the law's approval," and "[i]f marriage can survive the drug
dealer marrying the child abuser, it can probably weather
the storm of [two men or two women marrying]. '"24 Finally,
to drive home his point that the proposed Federal Marriage
Amendment "is the biggest assault on gay rights in U.S.
history," Andrew Sullivan remarked that the amendment
would ban considerably more than "equality in civil
marriage, a right that is now guaranteed to murderers,
child abusers,
deadbeat dads, multiple divorcees, and
25
foreigners."
Indeed, this notion that it is unfair to withhold the
right to marry from gays and lesbians because the
government routinely extends that right to a whole cast of
contemptible and repulsive characters now pervades
popular discourse in a way that recalls the public's quick
and easy reliance on the slippery slope to argue the
contrary. Why shouldn't gays and lesbians be allowed to
marry? Because otherwise, incest and bestiality. Why
should they be allowed to marry? Because already,
molestation ....

).

23. Marcosson, supra note 22, at 741.
24. Donald A. Dripps, Three Tensions, and One Omission, in the Case for the
FederalMarriageAmendment, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 935, 938 (2005).
25. Andrew Sullivan, Editorial, A Call to Arms: It's No Exaggeration To Say
That the FederalMarriageAmendment is the Biggest Assault on Gay Rights in
U.S. History, THE ADVOCATE, Nov. 11, 2003, available at http://findarticles.com/
p/articles/mi_m1589/is_2003_Nov_11/ai_111166134
[hereinafter Sullivan, A
Call to Arms]; see also David Adox, What's the Difference Between a Homosexual
and a Murderer?A: One Can Get Married, The Other Can't, SALON, May 2, 1997,
http://www.salon.com/may97/sullivan970502.html. ('The Constitution guarantees
the right to marry to murderers, to prisoners, to people with a history of neglecting
their children, to people who have remarried 10 times, to O.J. Simpson, to
Elizabeth Taylor. If all these people have a fundamental civil right to marry, as
I think they do, we do too."); Andrew Sullivan, Op-Ed., The State of Our Unions,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2003 at A24 [hereinafter Sullivan, The State of Our Unions]
("Even murderers on death row have the constitutional right to marry, where
the institution could do no conceivable social good.").
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murderers and pedophiles. 26 Or, as a writer on one website
remarked: "The United States Supreme Court has held that
marriage can not [sic] even be denied to incarcerated felons.
Thus, in every state, murderers and rapists may marry, but
loving, committed,
tax-paying soccer moms may not if they
27
are lesbians.

'

Progressive comparative rhetoric is not limited to
academic commentary and popular discourse. Rather,
plaintiffs in marriage equality cases, and even some courts,
have increasingly appealed to a version of the argument as
a way of expressing what on an immediate, intuitive level
seems inexcusably unjust. For instance, during the trial of
the first phase of California's marriage equality case, In re
Marriage Cases, an attorney for the plaintiffs responded to
the state's attorney's argument that California's oppositesex marriage limitation protects children with the following
remarks: "Child abusers, child molesters, even child
murderers can get married as long as they marry someone
of the opposite sex."28 More recently, in that same case, the
city of San Francisco argued in its brief to the California
Supreme Court that "the marriage exclusion tells lesbians
26. A survey of blogs and other websites dealing with the question of samesex marriage has produced a number of hits where this claim is made. See, e.g.,
Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Amendment 3: Radical and Wrong, DESERT MORNING
NEWS, Oct. 10, 2004, at AA02, available at http://old.law.utah.edu/faculty/bios/
greenwoodd/opinionradicalandwrong.htm ("If murderers can marry, surely lawabiding citizens should be allowed to do so too."); Demian, Most Compelling
Reasons for Legal Marriage (Mar. 15, 2007), http://www.buddybuddy.com/
demian0l.html ("[H]igh courts have ruled, that sinners, such as murderers,
convicted felons, wife-beaters, and adulterers-even if they are in prison-have
the constitutional right to marry."); Reflections by Naomi Stephan,
http://www.blog.naomimusic.com (June 13, 2006, 20:05) ("Mass murderers, wife
beaters, pedophiles, sex offenders, child abusers, alcoholics, criminals and
rapists [can] marry one opposite sex gender person."); Best Webfoot Forward,
http://webfoot.com/Blog/MarriagePost20040629.html (June 29, 2004) ("Murderers
have the right to get married. Serial killers have the right to get married. Serial
rapists have the right to get married. Even men who are still in prison for
raping and killing multiple women have the right to get married .... Convicted
child abusers have the right to get married. Convicted child molesters have the
right to get married. People convicted of molesting and killing multiple children
have the right to get married.").
27. Same Sex Marriage, http://www.libertyassociates.com/pages/SameSex
Marriage.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2007).
28. Ed Brayton:
More Bad Arguments Against Gay Marriage,
http://scienceblogs.com/dispatches/2004/12/more-bad-arguments-againstgay.php
(Dec. 26, 2004, 6:13 PM).
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and gay men that they are less worthy than child abusers,
or sex offenders, or convicts in prison for murder. Because
29
after all, those people do have the right to get married."
Finally, a plaintiff in an earlier case contended that the
argument that opposite-sex marriage limitations are
constitutional because gays and lesbians make bad parents
doesn't "hold water" because "[a]lcoholics, drug addicts and
those on welfare ... are given the right to marry and bring
children into this world. . .. "30
The progressive comparative argument (or progressive
comparative reasoning) has had similar appeal for some
jurists. Some courts, for instance, have reasoned that the
31
procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions
is irrational because "all sorts of people can marry and have
children: convicted murderers, child abusers, pedophiles,
racketeers, and drug pushers. '32 Others have asserted that
the fundamental right to marry cannot be withheld from
same-sex couples since it "cannot be taken from deadbeat
'33
dads, spousal abusers, and other condemned criminals.
And still others have remarked that the procreation
rationale is "grossly under-inclusive" because "[c]onvicted
felons (including those guilty of child and/or spousal abuse),
persons who don't fulfill child support obligations, and
and/or substance
persons suffering from mental health
34
abuse problems are allowed to marry."
29. Petitioner City and County of San Francisco's Opening Brief on the
Merits at 1-2, In re Marriage Cases, No. S147999 (Cal. Apr. 2, 2007), available
at http://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/cityattorney/SUPCT-OPENINGBRIEF.pdf;
see also id. at 47 (stating that "in granting marriage licenses,... the State [does
not] inquire into a person's fitness as a spouse or a parent. People who have
People who have
been divorced several times have the option to try again ....
committed and even been convicted of domestic violence may marry. Sex
offenders and child abusers may marry").
30. Brief and Argument of Appellant-Regina Pavone at 31, In re Estate of
Hall, 707 N.E.2d 201 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (No. 97-4654).
31. The argument is that same-sex marriage prohibitions are constitutional
because they are rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest in
encouraging the propagation of the human race.
32. New York v. Greenleaf, 780 N.Y.S.2d 899, 903 (Just. Ct. 2004).
33. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 764 (Ct. App. 2006) (Kline,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), superceded by grant of review 149
P.3d 737 (Cal. 2006).
59,

34. Ruling on Plaintiffs' and Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment at
Varnum v. Brien, No. CV5965 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Aug. 30, 2007),
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It is finally worth noting that courts have also turned to
the comparative argument in contexts other than same-sex
marriage. For instance, dissenting in Lofton v. Secretary of
the Department of Children and Family Services, in which
the Eleventh Circuit upheld Florida's statute that categorically
prohibits sexual minorities from becoming adoptive
parents, one judge reasoned that the state's alleged interest
in protecting children from societal disapproval of
homosexuality was woefully underinclusive since the state
did not also ban "[c]hild abusers, terrorists, drug dealers,
rapists and murderers" from adopting. 35 Similarly, in
upholding the state of New York's Sex Offender
Registration Act (SORA) against a federal due process
claim in People v. Cintron,36 the state supreme court
reasoned that "[i]f the right to enter into a same sex
marriage is not considered fundamental, the right to avoid
stigmatization as a sex offender . . .most certainly cannot
rise to this status."37 Whereas courts typically advert to the
comparative argument in a permit-permit sense (i.e., if
pedophiles, then same-sex couples), the Cintron court used
it in an alternative, not-permit-not-permit sense (i.e., if not
same-sex couples, then surely not sex offenders).
C. Conservative ComparativeDisgust and Progressive
Comparative Worth: A Comparison
Progressive comparative worth rhetoric shares many of
the substantive and structural features of its conservative
forebear. Before analyzing the arguments' similarities,
however, it is useful to consider their differences. Progressive
comparative rhetoric differs from the conservative marriage
slippery slope argument in four key respects.
First, whereas the conservative slippery slope argument
is, of course, a sloped hierarchy (i.e., if same-sex marriage,
then we might inexorably slip or slide into incest and
bestiality), the hierarchy generated by its progressive
counterpart is relatively fixed and static (i.e., gays and
lesbians, or same-sex couples, will not cause slippage into
http://www.domawatch.org/stateissues/iowa/varnumvbrien.html.
35. 377 F.3d 1275, 1301 (11th Cir. 2004).
36. 827 N.Y.S.2d 445 (Sup. Ct. 2006).
37. Id. at 453.
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something worse but are being treated worse than those
who are far inferior to them). Second, whereas the
conservative slippery slope argument is deployed in a
prohibit-prohibit sense (i.e., in order to prohibit incest we
must also prohibit same-sex marriage), its progressive
version operates in a permit-permit sense (i.e., if sex
offenders or welfare recipients can marry, then surely
same-sex couples can). Third, and relatedly, whereas the
conservative slippery slope argument presages that we
theoretically could slip into something bad (e.g., the legal
recognition of incest), its progressive version assumes that
we are already in a situation where the bad thing is
permitted (e.g., sex offenders marrying). Fourth, and last,
whereas the conservative slippery slope argument is a
slippery hierarchy of relationships (i.e., same-sex marriage,
incest, polygamy, bestiality), its progressive version is
largely a fixed and static hierarchy of people (i.e., sexual
minorities as compared to murderers, sex offenders, welfare
recipients, etc.).
Notwithstanding these differences, we might think
about the progressive comparative argument as an
imitation of the conservative marriage slippery slope
argument for four reasons. First, and on a purely aural
level, the arguments sound similar. They both rely, for
example, on a linguistic strategy of amplificatio, a
rhetorical term that refers to the arranging of words in a
sequence of increasing force for dramatic and persuasive
effect. 38 Slippery slope arguments reach a climax as one
nears the bottom of the slope: polygamy, incest, and even
bestiality. 39 Similarly, the progressive
comparative
38. See Gideon 0. Burton, The Forest of Rhetoric (Silva Rhetoricae),
http://rhetoric.byu.edu/ (search "Silva Rhetoricae" for "figures of amplification";
then follow matching hyperlink).
39. See, e.g., Dan Kennedy, Dept. of Perverse Logic: Doing it Doggy-Style
on

the

Homophobic

Right,

THE

PHOENIX.COM,

July

11-17,

2003,

http://www.thebostonphoenix.combostonlnews-features/this-just-in/documents
/03007023.htm (citing the conservative slippery slope argument that '[o]nce
consent-"choice"-supplants marriage as the important interest served by
cloaking sexual activities as constitutional rights, by what principle is any
consensual adult sexual conduct not a protected right? Bigamy? Polygamy?
Prostitution? Incest? Even-if we assume animals can consent, or that their
consent does not matter-bestiality?' (quoting George Will, Lap Dancingon the
Constitution, June 27, 2003, http://www.sodomylaws.org/lawrence/lweditorials
099.htm)); THE AM. FAMILY ASS'N, HOMOSEXUALITY IN AMERICA: EXPOSING THE
MYTHS

5

(1994),

http://www.afa.net/homosexual-agenda/homosexuality.pdf
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argument catalogues undesirables in a hierarchical
sequence of increasing severity: "[c]hild abusers, child
molesters, and even child murderers" 4 0 or "[e] yen murderers
41
on death row have the constitutional right to marry."
Second, and on a substantive level, progressive
comparative arguments use totalizing rhetoric that recalls
the totalizing tendencies of the slippery slope. The conservative
slippery slope is totalizing because it (inaccurately) assumes,
for example, that "incest" is something that we all know when
we see it, despite the fact that the definition of incest
might-and often does-differ significantly from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. 42 Similarly, the progressive comparative
argument is totalizing because it often assumes (1) that all
murderers or all sex offenders are equally bad, and (2) that
murderers, sex offenders, and other undesirables are
heterosexual. 43 In other words, neither the conservative nor
the progressive comparative argument makes fine-tuned
distinctions within the larger category or categories that it
is using as a point of comparison (e.g., incest, sex offenders)
to the state of affairs under consideration (e.g., same-sex
marriage, the legal prohibition thereof).
Third, and on a structural level, the progressive
comparative argument, like the conservative marriage
slippery slope trope, is comparative. The conservative
slippery slope argument has a comparative or relative
structure that assumes that certain relationships (i.e.,
same-sex marriage) are less disgusting than others (i.e.,
incest and bestiality), even as they all must be equally
prohibited. In much the same way, the progressive
comparative argument has a comparative or relative
structure that assumes that committed gays and lesbians
deserve marriage more than a whole host of unsavory
characters, including, but not limited to, murderers, child
abusers, pedophiles and other sex offenders, and welfare
("Prominent homosexual leaders and publications have voiced support for
pedophilia, incest, sadomasochism, and even bestiality.").
40. Brayton, supra note 28 (emphasis added).
41. Sullivan, The State of Our Unions, supra note 25, at A24 (emphasis
added).
42. See Cahill, supra note 4, at 1562-66 (noting the definitional variety of
incest in the United States).
43. But see ESKRIDGE, supra note 19, at 12 (recognizing that the group of
deviants to which sexual minorities are being compared are heterosexuals).
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recipients. In other words, according to the conservative
comparative argument, X, or same-sex marriage, is not as
bad as Y, or incest/bestiality. Similarly, according to the
progressive comparative argument, X, or sexual minorities
who cannot marry,44are not as bad as Y, or heterosexual sex
offenders who can.
44. Theoretically, one might here object that marriage progressives have
deployed the comparative argument not to suggest that sexual minorities, or
same-sex couples, are necessarily better than, say, sex offenders, child
murderers, and sadomasochists. Rather, perhaps they have deployed the
comparative argument to show that same-sex marriage prohibitions are really
based on animus against sexual minorities as people because they do not
similarly apply to murderers, who are considered by others to be at least as bad.
Or, perhaps they have deployed the comparative argument to show that samesex marriage prohibitions that are predicated on morality or child-welfare
concerns are underinclusive because they fail to include within their ambit
individuals who also engage in behavior that many individuals likely find
immoral or an endangerment to children. Under this view, sexual minorities, or
same-sex couples, need not be better than sex offenders, murderers, and
sadomasochists to make the argument work. Rather, the relevant characteristic
that they bear in this context (i.e., a gay or lesbian sexual orientation) need
simply not be any more dangerous or immoral than the relevant 'characteristics'
that murderers and sex offenders bear in this context (i.e., a history of physical
and sexual violence, respectively). Put differently, the progressive comparative
argument does not necessarily hang on a comparative or relative distinction
between sexual minorities and the folks to whom they are being compared.
Rather, if I argue that "gays and lesbians should be able to marry because sex
offenders or murderers already can," I might in effect be saying that "because
gays and lesbians are certainly no more dangerous and immoral (or perceived
by others as such) than murderers and sex offenders, gays and lesbians should
be able to marry the person of their choice also." Under this interpretation,
whether gays and lesbians are better people is beside the point because what
really matters is whether the same justifications that are offered in defense of
same-sex marriage prohibitions similarly apply to certain heterosexual people.
If so, then it makes no sense to deny to group X, sexual minorities, that which is
given to group Y, heterosexual murderers and sex offenders.
At the same time, however, it is much more likely that the progressive
comparative argument assumes that sexual minorities, or same-sex couples, are
better than the disreputable folks who already can get married. Those
progressive comparative arguments that have been made in the wake of
Lawrence v. Texas likely assume that sexual minorities are better than, say, sex
offenders because after that case members of the former group no longer
presumptively engaged in criminal activity-something which we know that
members of the latter group have engaged in simply by virtue of the fact that it
includes sex offenders. Those progressive comparative arguments that were
made even before Lawrence was decided likely assumed that sexual minorities
were better than, say, sex offenders and murderers because the "criminal
activity" in which members of the former group presumptively engage
(presumably) did not involve harm to others in the same way that many sex
offenses and murder both do. Indeed, we would be hard pressed to read a
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Fourth, and on a more functional level, the progressive
comparative argument, like the conservative marriage
slippery slope trope, uses its comparisons to trigger either
moral indignation, disgust, or both simultaneously. The
conservative comparative argument directs our disgust at
that which sits at the abyss of the slope, that is, at that
which is morally worse than that which rests at the top (i.e.,
same-sex marriage). While the progressive comparative
argument does not direct what can properly be called our
"disgust" toward the thing at the top of the hierarchygays, lesbians, and same-sex couples generally-it does
trigger our indignation over the inequity of prohibiting
individuals from marrying who are comparatively that
much better than a whole host of "repulsive" figures who
are already allowed to do so. In other words, according to
the conservative comparative argument, we are disgusted
because X, or that which is better than Y and which
disgusts us less, might lead us straightaway into Y, or that
which disgusts us more (or the most). Similarly, according
to the progressive comparative argument, we are outraged
because X, which is better than Y, is being treated worse
than y.45
While the comparison between sexual minorities and
sex offenders might very well trigger our indignation over
the inequity of withholding from the former that which is
enjoyed by the latter, does it necessarily trigger our
disgust? This Essay contends that the progressive
statement like "those people [i.e., sex offenders] do have the right to get
married" (whereas worthy gays and lesbians do not) in any way but as a
declaration that gays and lesbians are better than sex offenders and for that
reason really deserve the right to marry. When one hears a progressive
comparative argument like the one deployed by the city of San Francisco, see
generally Petitioner City and County of San Francisco's Opening Brief on the
Merits, supra note 29, what one immediately hears is not the legal argument
that it implicitly contains (i.e., same-sex marriage prohibitions that flow from a
desire to protect children are underinclusive because they do not similarly apply
to murderers and sex offenders). Rather, what one hears, I think, is the
following: Is it not ludicrous that morally good sexual minorities are denied a
right that is otherwise freely given to all sorts of bad people?
45. In a sense, the progressive comparative argument might be characterized
as a kind of reverse slippery slope. Whereas the slippery slope assumes that
something not so bad or disgusting could (and likely would) lead us into
something worse (and truly disgusting), the progressive comparative argument
assumes that the worst or "most disgusting" has already happened (i.e., sex
offenders marrying). For that reason, it makes no sense to prohibit that which
is "less bad" or less disgusting, so to speak, from happening.
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comparative argument could very well have the effect,
whether intended or not, of triggering not only our moral
outrage or indignation at the inequity of same-sex marriage
prohibitions but also our disgust at the less worthy group
that already enjoys that right. Indeed, when the city of San
Francisco argued in its marriage equality brief that "the
marriage exclusion tells lesbians and gay men that they are
less worthy than child abusers, or sex offenders, or convicts
in prison for murder. Because after all, those people do
have the right to get married,"46 we are likely outraged, and
perhaps even disgusted, at two interrelated things: (1) the
fact that worthy "lesbians and gay men" cannot get married
(at least to each other); and (2) the fact that unworthy sex
offenders, or "those people," can (assuming, of course, that
"those people" are heterosexual).
In addition, even if the city of San Francisco's primary
intention was not to direct our disgust at "those people" who
"do have the right to get married," "those people" who "do
have the right to get married" become the likely targets of
our disgust simply by virtue of the way in which the city
calls attention to those people and their right: (1) by calling
them "those people"; and (2) by driving home the absurdity
of the situation by italicizing "do." Similarly, by exhaustively
cataloguing all the unsavory folks who do enjoy the right to
marry-"[c]hild abusers, child molesters, even child
murderers,"47 or "murderers and rapists (even those who
have murdered or raped previous spouses)" 4 8-do
not
marriage progressives evoke disgust at the idea of the most
unsavory among them enjoying something which worthy
gays and lesbians cannot, in much the same way that we
are disgusted at the prospect of same-sex marriage leading
to incest? In other words, progressives' primary purpose for
using the comparative argument might very well be to
trigger our indignation over the inequity of same-sex
marriage prohibitions. The fact that they use rhetoric that
shares so much in common with the conservative
comparative disgust argument, however, suggests that
their comparative arguments might very well trigger our
disgust as well.
46. Petitioner City and County of San Francisco's Opening Brief on the
Merits, supra note 29, at 1-2.
47. Brayton, supra note 28.
48. Freeman, supra note 18, at 1-2.
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The progressive comparative argument suffers from a
number of descriptive and normative problems that Part III
will address in greater detail. Before addressing the
question of whether the progressive comparative argument
is a good idea, however, it is first useful to inquire why
marriage progressives have increasingly relied on an
argument that imitates, whether deliberately or not, some
of the most normatively questionable aspects of conservative
marriage discourse. Part II will now turn to that inquiry.
II. THE PROGRESSIVE COMPARATIVE ARGUMENT: WHY IS IT So
POPULAR?

Having demonstrated that the rhetorical discourse of
marriage equality echoes the disgust-triggering features of
the conservative comparative argument, or slippery slope,
the following question remains: why might marriage
progressives even unconsciously mimic the same rhetoric of
disgust that is so often used against them? This Part offers
three explanations for the appearance of this rhetoric in
progressive marriage discourse. Section A considers a
doctrinal explanation for this rhetorical phenomenon.
Section B considers a rhetorical explanation. And Section C
considers a disgust-based explanation.
A. The Legal/DoctrinalExplanation
One explanation for the progressive appropriation of
conservative marriage rhetoric is that it helps progressives
show how "similarly situated" they are to the good
heterosexuals who really deserve the right to marry. More
specifically, marriage equality advocacy has increasingly
deployed what Professor Marc Spindelman has referred to
as a "like-straight" logic in order to show that same-sex
couples are similarly situated to their heterosexual
counterparts with respect to the right to marry. 49 For
instance, Spindelman has observed that the predominant
legal strategy of gay and lesbian plaintiffs in the litigation
surrounding Goodridge v. Department of Public Health50
49. Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality's Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361, 1365-

75 (2005).

50. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (striking down Massachusetts's oppositesex marriage limitation on state constitutional grounds).
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was to emphasize their similarity to, rather than their
differences from, heterosexual people who desire to marry. 51
He notes that the plaintiffs' lawyers united two "formally
distinct doctrinal [i.e., liberty and equality] claims" with "a
remarkably uncomplicated proposition: Lesbians and gay
men are just like heterosexuals. '52 As he summarizes that
strategy:
[L]esbian and gay rights advocates maintained that lesbians and
gay men deserve the same rights and privileges heterosexuals
receive, including the right to marry, and for just the same
reasons. As Mary Bonauto, speaking for the lesbian and gay
plaintiffs in the case, put it as she began her oral arguments
before the Supreme Judicial Court:
The Plaintiffs stand before this court seeking nothing more
and nothing less than the same respect under our laws and
Constitution as all other people [read: heterosexuals] enjoy.
The same "liberty right" to marry the person of their choice
and the same "equal 5right"
to marry on the same terms
3
applied to other people.

Spindelman further observes that the Goodridge
majority's opinion, which found that Massachusetts's
opposite-sex marriage limitation violated state constitutional
liberty and equality guarantees, is driven by the same
'like-straight' logic" that characterized the plaintiffs'
arguments in that case. 54 The Goodridge majority, he
remarks, "delivers . . . a definition of marriage that has

built into it the idea that lesbians and gay men, hence their
relations, are just like heterosexuals, and theirs." 55
Moreover, the majority "[e]xchang[es] the classic definition"
of marriage, which rests on the "presumption that
heterosexuality and homosexuality are unalike," for "one
that implicitly negates it."56 In short, the Goodridge
majority opinion, like the successful litigation strategy that
gave rise to it, is predicated on a simple truth, namely, the
51. Spindelman, supra note 49, at 1365-66.

52. Id. at 1365.
53. Id. at 1365-66 (quoting, in part, Unofficial Transcript of Oral Argument
at 1, Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (No. SJC - 08860)).
54. Spindelman, supra note 49, at 1365-66.
55. Id. at 1367.
56. Id.
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fact "that homosexuality and heterosexuality are alike." 57
Because of its success as a litigation strategy in
Goodridge, like-straight logic has come to dominate the
legal strategies of advocates in more recent marriage
equality litigation. For instance, the plaintiffs in one
marriage equality case argued that "same-sex couples and
their children deserve the same rights, protections, and
dignity under the law as heterosexual couples and their
children."5 8 Moreover, those same plaintiffs maintained
that "just as heterosexual relationships arise from existing
social and religious practices, so too do the relationships
of... same-sex couples ...who are responsible, contributing
members of their communities." 59
Similarly, advocates for same-sex couple plaintiffs in
other cases have argued that "[s]ame-sex committed
relationships deserve to be honored with the same rights
and responsibilities that are granted to heterosexual
couples, ' '60 and that "lesbian and gay couples often have
stable, committed, and enduring relationships that play the
same central role in their lives as they do for heterosexuals,
and... they can provide stable family environments just as
heterosexuals can. '61 The like-straight logic that winds its
way throughout recent marriage equality litigation
hearkens back not only to the Goodridge majority's implicit
denial of the "presumption that heterosexuality and
homosexuality are unalike," 62 but also to the similar likestraight reasoning
that animated the majority opinion in
Lawrence.63
57. Id. at 1370.
58. Respondents' Answer to Amici Curiae Briefs at 23, Woo v. California, 49
Cal. Rptr. 3d 675 (Ct. App. 2006) (No. Al10451).
59. Id. at 23 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Brief of Amici Curiae Human Rights Campaign et al. in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6, Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2005) (No. A-002244-G3T5).
61. Appellants' Abstract, Brief, and Addendum at 429-30, Dep't of Human
Srvcs. v. Howard, 367 Ark. 55 (2006) (No. 05-814).
62. Spindelman, supra note 49, at 1367.
63. That is, Lawrence starts to talk about the sexual minority and the
sexual majority in similar terms by establishing the latter as the point of
comparison to the former. For insteince, the Court states that "[p]ersons in a
homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for . . . purposes [relating to

marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
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Marriage progressives' like-straight reasoning is in
many ways doctrinally compelled, or at the very least
strategically savvy, because its purpose is to demonstrate
the extent to which same-sex couples are like, rather than
unlike, their heterosexual counterparts when it comes to
marriage. Indeed, as all first-year law students know, laws
that treat similarly-situated individuals differently violate
constitutionally protected equality guarantees. Consequently,
the more same-sex couples are like heterosexual couples, the
more likely it is that a court will find, as did the majority in
Goodridge, that same and opposite-sex couples are similarly
situated with respect to the right to marry and that an
evenhanded distribution of that right is constitutionally
required.
The progressive comparative argument employs the
same like-straight logic that has proven successful as a
litigation strategy. As discussed, the progressive
comparative argument highlights the extent to which sexual
minorities, or same-sex couples, are better than, and
therefore to some degree different from, contemptible
characters like heterosexual murderers and sex offenders
who already can get married. In so doing, the progressive
comparative argument simultaneously implies that sexual
minorities, or same-sex couples, are more like all those
"good, law-abiding" heterosexuals who enjoy the right to
marry and less like all those "bad, law-breaking"
heterosexuals who also enjoy that right-but perhaps
deserve it less. Put differently, most progressive comparative
arguments implicitly create three categories of people: good
heterosexuals (e.g., the non-sex offenders who can marry);
bad heterosexuals (e.g., the sex offenders who can marry);
and all sexual minorities. By implying that sexual
minorities are better than the bad heterosexuals who may
legally marry, the progressive comparative argument at
least implicitly places sexual minorities/same-sex couples in
the category of the good heterosexuals. In so doing, the
progressive comparative argument employs a kind of likeeducation], just as heterosexual persons do." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
574 (2003) (emphasis added). Moreover, the Lawrence majority criticizes the
Bowers v. Hardwick Court for framing the right at issue in that case as a "right
to engage in certain sexual conduct" and thereby "demean[ing] the claim the
individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be
said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse." Id. at 567
(emphasis added).
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straight reasoning that is doctrinally motivated: it is not
only that sexual minorities (or same-sex couples) are like
heterosexuals, but that they are like the best heterosexuals
who really deserve the right to marry.
In much the same way that like-straight reasoning as a
litigation strategy emphasizes the extent to which same-sex
couples are "just like" good, responsible heterosexual
couples and "can provide stable family environments just as
[good, responsible] heterosexuals can," 64 the progressive
comparative argument implicitly casts same-sex couples as
the mirror image of good heterosexual couples (and sexual
minorities as the mirror image of good heterosexuals).
Indeed, the heterosexuals (or heterosexual couples) to
whom marriage progressives analogize sexual minorities/
same-sex couples are all remarkably good, responsible,
upstanding heterosexuals
(or heterosexual
couples),
heterosexuals "who are responsible, contributing members
of their communities" 65 and who "can provide stable family
environments."' 6 6 It is these heterosexuals with whom sexual
minorities/same-sex couples are aligning themselves in
marriage equality litigation, rather than with those other
non-law-abiding heterosexuals whose enjoyment of the
right to marry is perhaps undeserved, or at least less
deserved-to say nothing of a slap in the face to all good
sexual minorities.
The progressive comparative argument therefore works
together with like-straight reasoning in order to show that
sexual minorities are like not just heterosexuals, but the
very best among them. When viewed in this light, laws that
withhold the right to marry from same-sex couples and that
treat them differently from the class to whom they are truly
similarly situated, seem doubly wrong.
B. The Rhetorical Explanation
A second explanation for the progressive appropriation
of conservative marriage rhetoric is that it helps to persuade
marriage traditionalists that marriage progressives are
more, rather than less, like them. If the objective of rhetoric
64. Appellants' Abstract, Brief, and Addendum, supranote 61, at 429-30.
65. Respondents' Answer to Amici Curiae Briefs, supra note 58, at 23.
66. Appellants' Abstract, Brief, and Addendum, supranote 61, at 430.
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generally is to persuade an audience, 67 then the objective of
imitative rhetoric specifically is to persuade an audience by
showing that audience that you are similar to it. Indeed, by
adopting the language and figures of speech of their
opponents, whether consciously or not, marriage progressives
might not only convince their opponents that they are like
them but also, in so doing, get their opponents to like them
more.
Scholars of rhetoric, cognitive science, and social
psychology have shown that language is at its most
persuasive when the speaker is able to identify with her
audience, and that rhetorical imitation is one of the most
effective ways to set the conditions that make identification
possible. For instance, literary theorist and philosopher,
Kenneth Burke has argued that "[y]ou persuade a man only
insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture,
tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways
with his."68 In other words, in Burke's view, the most
effective way for a speaker to persuade his audience is to
use "ideas and images that identify his cause with that" of
his audience. 69 Burke refers to this form of persuasion as
"identification," a mode of communication that has a
"magical" quality because it "induce[s] action in people" just
as magic is thought "to induce motion in things." 7 0 Reduced
to its simplest terms, identification assumes the following:
the more I "speak your language," the more likely it is that
you will identify with me, and, perhaps, do what I want.
Under a more cynical view, rhetorical imitation is the way
in which speakers trick, manipulate, or even deceive their
audience into identifying with them and into doing what
they want. 71 Under a less cynical view, rhetorical imitation
67. The Oxford English Dictionary defines rhetoric as "[t]he art of using
language so as to persuade or influence others." OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
supra note 5, at 857; see also KENNETH BURKE, A RHETORIC OF MOTIVES 46
(University of California Press 1969) (1950) ("Rhetoric is the art of persuasion,
or a study of the means of persuasion available for any given situation.").
68. BURKE, supranote 67, at 55.
69. Id. at 55.
70. Id. at 42.
71. See, e.g., id. at 23 (stating that "one need
'identification' very sharply to see, implied in
counterpart: division. Rhetoric is concerned with
Fall. Its contribution to a 'sociology of knowledge'

not scrutinize the concept of
it at every turn, its ironic
the state of Babel after the
must often carry us far into
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is the way in which speakers use their magic to enable
group cooperation, build social networks, and even "assist[]
'72
the survival of cultures by promoting social cohesion.
Cognitive scientists and social psychologists who have
studied verbal and non-verbal mimicry in human
interaction have shown that what for Burke is largely a
rhetorical theory of identificatiGn is, in fact, a routine
human practice. For instance, through a series of
experiments, cognitive
scientists have shown that
individuals in a group "automatically" assume the verbal
and non-verbal expressions of their group members at least
73
in part to establish a positive relationship with them.
They have demonstrated that "the perception of another's
behavior (be it facial expression, body posture, mannerism,
etc.) increases the tendency for the perceiver to behave in a
similar manner, and that this is an entirely passive and
nonconscious
phenomenon." 74
They
refer
to
this
"nonconscious mimicry" as a kind of "chameleon effect," that
is, "the mechanism behind mimicry and behavioral
coordination" and "the source of the observed smoother
social interaction and interpersonal bonding produced by
the (nonconscious) mimicry." 75 A series of experiments
designed to test the "chameleon effect" theory confirmed
scientists' predictions that the "chameleon effect" is not only
automatic and "nonconscious," but also a useful way of
"enhanc[ing] the positivity of social interactions" and
promoting social cohesion. 76 That is, in group settings,
verbal and non-verbal imitation can 77
"produce greater
rapport and smoother social interactions."
Similarly, a number of social psychologists and scholars
of sociolinguistics have proposed that individuals mimic or
the lugubrious regions of malice and the lie").
72. Id. at 43; see also id. (stating that rhetoric "is rooted in an essential
function of language itself, a function that is wholly realistic, and is continually
born anew; the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in
beings that by nature respond to symbols" (emphasis omitted)).
73. See Tanya L. Chartrand & John A. Bargh, The Chameleon Effect: The
Perception-Behavior Link and Social Interaction, 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 893 (1999).

74. Id. at 897.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 907.
77. Id.
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imitate the verbal and non-verbal patterns of those with
whom they wish to identify in both conscious and
unconscious ways. According to the two theories on which
these scholars have largely relied to describe this process,
speech accommodation theory (SAT) and communication
accommodation theory (CAT), individuals "adapt to each
other's communicative behaviors in terms of a wide range of
linguistic-prosodic-nonverbal features including speech
rate, pausal phenomena and utterance length, phonological
variants, smiling, gaze, and so on." 78
CAT in particular "proposes that speech convergence
reflects . . . a speakers' [sic] or a group's need (often
unconscious) for social integration or identification with
another." 79 Moreover, the theory relies "heavily on notions
of similarity attraction, which, in its simplest form,
suggests that as one person becomes more similar to
another, this increases the likelihood that the second will
like the first," and posits that "convergence through speech
and nonverbal behaviors is one of the many strategies that
may be adopted to become more similar to another,
involving the reduction of linguistic dissimilarities. ' 80 In
other words, according to CAT, individuals mimic or imitate
the communicative patterns of others in order to (1)
"become more similar" to them, (2) demonstrate that they
are like them, and (3) increase the likelihood that others
will like them.
Indeed, experiments designed to test the CAT theory
found that "those who believed themselves to be similar
coordinated and influenced one another's speech patterns
and timing more than other dyads, presumably because
perceived similarity induces a more positive orientation and
a relatively high level of interpersonal certainty."' 81 If the
"chameleon effect" maintains that we unconsciously adapt
to the verbal and non-verbal patterns of others, CAT
confirms that such unconscious adaptation or imitation
really works. In short, one way to get people to like us is to
speak and act like them. Speaking and acting like them, in
78. CONTEXTS OF ACCOMMODATION: DEVELOPMENTS IN APPLIED SOCIOLINGUISTICS
7 (Howard Giles et al. eds., 1991).
79. Id. at 18.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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turn, makes them like us more. These studies collectively
suggest that what for Burke is largely a conscious or
deliberate effort to imitate others, and thereby persuade
them and foster social cohesion, is something which
82
individuals already do anyway on a "nonconscious" level.
Returning now to the progressive comparative
argument, it could be that marriage progressives have
increasingly deployed an argument that "sounds like" the
conservative marriage slippery slope in order to identify
with conservatives and to persuade them that they are
more, rather than less, like them. If individuals naturally
and intuitively appropriate the verbal and non-verbal
gestures of others with whom they would like to identify
and whom, perhaps, they are trying to persuade, then it
could very well be that marriage progressives have started
to sound more like marriage traditionalists for those very
reasons. Just as from a doctrinal perspective it makes sense
for marriage progressives to cast same-sex couples as being
more like the good heterosexuals who really deserve to
marry, so too from a rhetorical perspective does it make
sense for them to cast their arguments in ways that will
persuade marriage traditionalists that marriage progressives
are more, rather than less, like them. In addition, by
sounding more "like" marriage traditionalists, marriage
progressives might not only convince their opponents that
they are "like" them, but also, in fact, get those opponents to
"like" them. Getting conservatives to like progressives, in
turn, is something which could yield positive results from a
strategic perspective, especially if it is the aim of
progressives to persuade those who are on the fence, so to
speak, about same-sex marriage to come to the other side.
That legal actors engage in rhetorical mimicry in order
either to persuade opponents or to identify with those who
are undecided on a certain issue is not, of course, an
uncommon phenomenon. For instance, in the abortion
context, Professor Reva Siegel has recently suggested that
"the antiabortion movement has borrowed core elements of
the pro-choice claim, and produced a woman-protective
82. At certain points in A Rhetoric of Motives, however, Burke also suggests
that rhetorical identification sometimes operates on an unconscious level.
BURKE, supra note 67, at 35 (stating that "there is a wide range of ways
whereby the rhetorical motive, through the resources of identification, can
operate without conscious direction by any particular agent").
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antiabortion argument that mixes new ideas about women's
rights with some very old ideas about women's roles." 83
Moreover, Siegel has shown that the conservative
appropriation of progressive rhetoric has been an extremely
effective way to "reach" and "appeal to . . . swing voters,"
that is, those who are "concerned about protecting women
as well as the unborn. '8 4 As in the abortion context, so too
in the marriage context have marriage progressives
"borrowed," whether deliberately or not, key elements of a
rhetorical strategy that has been a long time favorite of
legal actors generally and marriage traditionalists
specifically. While such borrowing might appear counterintuitive to us at first blush-indeed, why would a group
that is commonly the unfortunate target of rhetoric X by
group Y appropriate features of rhetoric X to persuade
group Y?-scholars have shown that it is not only intuitive
but an extremely effective agent of persuasion as well.
C. The "Conservationof Disgust"Explanation
A third and final explanation for the progressive
appropriation of disgust-driven conservative marriage
rhetoric is that disgust is a universal feature of all societies,
which "make use of disgust to inform their judgments of
high and low, worthy and unworthy."8 5 More specifically,
according to some commentators, those who are "low" in
status inevitably make use of the same disgust-driven
rhetoric that is so often used against them by those who are
"high" in status. For instance, those who support the
military's exclusionary policy, popularly known as "don't
ask, don't tell," have suggested that they "are disgusted by
the idea of sharing barracks with gays" and that their
disgust for sexual minorities (or the conduct in which that
class presumptively engages) is one of the driving purposes
behind the exclusionary policy.8 6 At the same time,
however, those who oppose a gay-soldier ban, and who
advocate for equal rights for sexual minorities in the
83. Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of
Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions,2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 992-93.

84. Id. at 992.
85. Dan M. Kahan, The Progressive Appropriation of Disgust, in
PASSIONS OF LAw 63, 64 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999).
86. Id. at 65.
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military, have similarly suggested that they find the
the exclusionary policy itself to
homophobia that underlies
87
be a source of disgust.
Professor Dan Kahan refers to this phenomenon
whereby those who are low in status (or whereby those who
advocate for those who are low in status) appropriate the
same idiom of disgust that is so often used against them as
"the conservation thesis."88 Drawing from Professor William
Miller's work on disgust, Kahan contends that "[t]he
conservation of disgust across distinct and evolving modes
of social organization explains why groups that are low in
status seek to appropriate rather than annihilate the idiom
of disgust, and why disgust, rather than disappearing,
becomes a salient focal point for political contention within
socially fluid, pluralistic societies."8 9 Quoting Miller in part,
Kahan notes that '[i]n the hurly-burly of anxious
competition for status,' different groups aggressively
market their favored conceptions of disgust 'either to
maintain rank already achieved, to test whether it ha[s]
been achieved, or to challenge for its acquisition.' 90 In other
words, in the struggle for equality, groups that are low in
status will predictably appropriate the same idiom of
disgust that was at one time the prerogative of those who
despise them. In so doing, they establish what Kahan calls
a liberal "counterregime of disgust" that counteracts
conservative disgust. 91 Under this view, "disgust inevitably
perseveres as social norms change." 92 To return to the
above-mentioned example, the homophobic disgust that
inspired "don't ask, don't tell" will "inevitably" become
disgust for the homophobe who supports that policy.
Miller and Kahan's "conservation thesis" is a useful
heuristic for explaining the progressive appropriation of
conservative disgust-laden rhetoric in the struggle for
marriage equality. Whereas Miller and Kahan contend that
those who are low in status "inevitably" redirect the disgust
of the high against the high (e.g., the sexual minority who
87. See id.

88. Id. at 64 (emphasis omitted).
89. Id. at 65.
90. Id. (quoting WILLIAM LAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST 217 (1997)).

91. Id. at 71.
92. Id. at 65.
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finds the homophobe's homophobia repugnant) here a
liberal discourse of disgust is being redirected toward those
who are thought to be truly disgusting in an effort to secure
equal rights. Rather than establishing a "counterregime of
disgust," the liberal or progressive comparative argument
that posits that gays and lesbians should be able to marry
because sex offenders already can effectively establish a
mini-regime of disgust within a larger discourse of disgust.
While progressives are not deploying this mini-regime of
disgust against those who are high in status in an effort to
they are deploying the rich
counteract their disgust,
"expressive capital" 93 of disgust in an effort to advance a
liberal objective-something which Kahan posits is an
"inevitable" by-product of liberal social movements that are
"concerned with securing . . . 'equal rights."'9 4 In so doing,
liberals who advocate for same-sex marriage deploy the
idiom of disgust as a "progressive rather than a reactionary
force"; 95 in the process, new hierarchies are created and
96
"disgust inevitably perseveres as social norms change.."
Indeed, were a court to find that an opposite-sex marriage
limitation was unconstitutional on the disgust-driven basis
that "even sex offenders may marry," then certainly disgust
"perseveres" notwithstanding the fact that it functions as
an agent of, rather than against, social and legal change.

III. THE PROGRESSIVE COMPARATIVE ARGUMENT: IS IT A GOOD
IDEA?

So far, this Essay has demonstrated that the progressive
comparative argument on which same-sex marriage
advocates have increasingly relied in marriage equality
litigation mimics, whether deliberately or not, the
conservative slippery slope trope. In addition, it has
provided three different explanations for this peculiar form
of rhetorical mimicry and has attempted to explain why
liberals would appropriate a discourse that is so frequently
deployed to advance conservative, if not reactionary, objectives.
Now, this Essay turns to a more normative evaluation of the

93. Id. at 71.
94. Id. at 65 (quoting MILLER, supra note 90, at 235).
95. Id. at 73.
96. Id. at 65.
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progressive comparative argument. Specifically, it will offer
three reasons why progressives should remain wary of
comparative discourse that mimics the slippery slope and
its disgust-inducing, or disgust-provoking, rhetoric in
marriage equality litigation: (1) because the progressive
comparative argument advances an image of marriage that
undercuts the dominant conception of marriage that
emerges from marriage equality discourse; (2) because the
argument could have the
progressive comparative
unfortunate effect of collapsing gays and lesbians (or samesex couples) into the unsavory individuals who purportedly
sit beneath them; and (3) because the progressive
comparative argument advances a vision of tolerance that is
decidedly thin.
A. The Progressive ComparativeArgument Undercuts
MarriageEquality's Dominant Conception of Marriage
The progressive comparative argument is strategically
counterproductive because it advances an image of
marriage that is inconsistent with the dominant conception
of marriage that emerges from marriage equality discourse.
More specifically, advocates for marriage equality have
largely argued that marriage is a wholesome and salutary
institution that effectively changes or transforms the way
that others perceive you. For instance, briefs that have been
filed in recent marriage equality litigation overwhelmingly
suggest that marriage (1) is a self-defining term that lends
"cultural respect and recognition" to those who marry; 97
(2) "gives [one] automatic membership in a vast club of
people whose values are clarified by their choice of
marriage"; 98 (3) can help to combat the deep-seated
stereotypes and "prejudices of others";99 and (4) not only
makes relationships "more real" 10 0 but also the individuals
who enter into that relationship "equal in other people's
97. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment at 59, Kerrigan v. Connecticut, No. 04-4001813 (Conn. Super. Ct.
July 12, 2006).
98. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 226 (N.J. 2006) (Poritz, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
99. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment, supra note 97, at 59 n.65.
100. See Lewis, 908 A.2d at 225-27.
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eyes."'101 Indeed, recent marriage equality arguments
conceptualize marriage as a value-conferring institution,
one whose magical, poetic, and nearly alchemical powers
you but also
not only alter the way that others perceive
02
person.1
a
as
are
you
who
change
effectively
If marriage equality advocates truly believe that
marriage has such transformative potential, then presumably
the unsavory folks-heterosexual sex offenders and
murderers-who already can get married become less so
upon entering a marital relationship. If marriage is
important because it lends "cultural respect and recognition"
to those who get married, because it helps to undermine the
"prejudices of others," and because it makes the people who
enter into that relationship more valuable and even more
real in the eyes of others, then at least theoretically the
rapist and the murderer who gets married becomes more
respectable-and less contemptible-merely by virtue of the
fact that he is, quite simply, married. Under this logic, the
pedophile who chooses to marry becomes a better and less
loathsome person than the pedophile who chooses not to.
Under this logic, the "prejudices" to which the sex offender
is daily subjected should, at least theoretically, vanish once
he gets married. Or, if the sex offender is already married
at the time that the sex offense occurs, then we should
believe that marriage has the transformative potential to
render him a more worthy and valuable individual in the
eyes of others.
The progressive comparative argument undermines
this wholesome vision of marriage because it suggests that
the despicable cast of characters who are afforded the right
to marry somehow remain despicable notwithstanding the
101. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 761 n.23 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct., 2006) (Kline, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), review
grantedand opinion superseded, 149 P.3d 737 (Cal. 2006).
102. For the conceptualization of marriage as poetry, see Ronald Dworkin,
Three Questions for America, 53 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 21, 2006, at 30 (stating
that "[t]he institution of marriage is unique: it is a distinct mode of association
and commitment with long traditions of historical, social, and personal
meaning" and that civil unions are insufficient because "[wie can no more now
create an alternate mode of commitment carrying a parallel intensity of
meaning than we can now create a substitute for poetry or for love"); see also
Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 290 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (Collester,
J.A.D., dissenting) (stating that "the essence of marriage ... is probably best
left to poets rather than judges" to express).
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fact that they might enter into a relationship that confers
worth, value, and equality. As Part I argued, the
progressive comparative argument relies on a hierarchy of
worth that assumes that gays and lesbians (or same-sex
couples) are better than all the bad heterosexuals who
either are already married or at the very least given the
opportunity to choose whether or not to get married. Under
the progressive comparative view, then, marriage exists on
a hierarchy, with some marriages being more worthy than
others and with not all marriages being equal. This
progressive comparative notion that not all marriages are
equal, however, undercuts the dominant conception of
marriage that emerges from marriage equality discourse,
that is, an institution that confers not only worth but also,
and perhaps more important, equality as well. In other
words, where the progressive comparative argument
understands marriage (and the individuals who enter into
it) as existing on a static hierarchy, marriage equality
discourse more generally sees marriage as an equalizing
force. Where the progressive comparative argument does
not necessarily understand marriage as something that
changes you-indeed, the image of a static hierarchy that
the progressive comparative argument projects suggests
quite the contrary-marriage equality discourse more
generally sees marriage as having transformative power.
B. The Progressive ComparativeArgument Could Have the
UnfortunateEffect of CollapsingSexual Minorities Into
the Deviant Class of HeterosexualsFrom Whom They
Claim to be Different
The progressive comparative argument could have the
unfortunate and counterproductive effect of encouraging
others to group sexual minorities (or same-sex couples) with
the very class of individuals from whom they are trying to
distance themselves. As this Essay suggested in Part I, the
progressive comparative argument establishes a hierarchy
of relative worth and positions sexual minorities (or samesex couples) on that hierarchy above the heterosexual riffraff that already enjoys the right to marry. In so doing, the
argument attempts to create distance between those who
are superior (and who therefore deserve marriage more)
and those who sit beneath them (and who therefore deserve
marriage less). In even considering sexual minorities
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relative to an allegedly inferior class of deviant individuals,
however, the progressive comparative argument sets the
conditions for establishing a relationshipbetween those two
groups. The very fact that the progressive comparative
argument is a relative one suggests that group X is always
being considered relative to group Y. Indeed, any relative or
comparative argument that functions according to a logic of
"better than" opens up the possibility that an audience will
start to consider that argument's relative points or
variables of comparison in similar or comparable ways.
Here, it is useful to return to the structure of the
slippery slope, the rhetorical figure with which the progressive
comparative argument shares many characteristics. Above,
this Essay suggested that the genius of the slippery slope is
that it forces us to consider the similarities between the
things that appear on it-same-sex marriage, incest,
bestiality-even as its very structure posits that some
things on the slope (incest) are worse than others (same-sex
marriage). In other words, while the slope assumes that
same-sex marriage is not as dangerous or deviant as incest,
its slippery gradient suggests that the less bad thing will
ineluctably collapse into something worse. While we might
be able to enumerate any number of ways by which to
distinguish between same-sex marriage (the less bad thing)
and incest (the worse thing), the structure of the slippery
slope effectively forces us to consider those relative
variables on it in similar or analogous terms. At a certain
level, then, it is not so much that same-sex marriage will
lead us into incest, but rather that same-sex marriage is
like or similar to incest.
Because the progressive comparative
argument
envisions a fixed or static hierarchy of persons rather than
a slippery slope of relationships, the likelihood that an
audience would collapse the relative variables that appear
on that hierarchy into each other is not as great. That said,
and much like the slippery slope, the progressive
comparative argument forces us to consider the less bad
thing (sexual minorities/same-sex couples) relative to the
worse thing (sexual offenders and murderers). While we
might be able to enumerate any number of ways by which
to distinguish between sexual minorities and sexual
offenders, in the process of doing so we might begin to
consider the ways in which they are similar to or like each
other. Comparing sexual minorities to sexual offenders-
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even if the comparison highlights how much better the
former is than the latter-is especially unwise given that
before Lawrence v. Texas members of the former group
presumptively engaged in conduct, sodomy, which was
criminal in some jurisdictions and could subject those
individuals to sex offender status. 103 Comparing sexual
minorities to pedophiles in particular-again, even if the
comparison is intended to highlight that the former is
comparatively better than the latter-could trigger
stereotypical fears that all sexual minorities are pedophiles
(and vice versa), much in the same way that comparing
same-sex marriage and incest could have the effect of
collapsing the two into each other and triggering disgust
over both. Indeed, even after Lawrence, courts have held
that evidence of a defendant's homosexuality, unless
relevant to the crime for which he is charged, cannot be
introduced at trial because "[a] jury's inference that a
defendant is gay can cause it also to infer that he deviated
from traditional sexual norms in other ways, specifically
10 4
that he engaged in illegal sexual conduct with minors."
By juxtaposing sexual minorities and sexual deviants, the
progressive comparative argument might work in a similar
manner by raising the "inference" that the two groups share
a common set of characteristics-to be sure, why else would
they even be situated on the same hierarchy?-and are
therefore comparable at least in some sense.

103. Before Lawrence, the Supreme Court held in Bowers that statutes that
criminalized even consensual sodomy did not violate the United States
Constitution. 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986). In addition, the Lawrence majority
noted that the petitioners' criminal sodomy convictions in that case required
them to register as sex offenders according to the "registration laws of a least
four States were [they] to be subject to their jurisdiction." 539 U.S. 558, 575
(2003).
104. Commonwealth v. Baran, Nos. 1804251, 181001 2006 WL 2560317, at
*26 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 16, 2006); see also Guam v. Shymanovitz, 157 F.3d
1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that "in our society homosexuality . . .is
often equated with indecency, perversion, and immorality, and gay persons are
often greeted with distrust and suspicion, particularly in their interactions with
children"); High Tech Gays v. Def. Indust. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp.
1361, 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("Wholly unfounded, degrading stereotypes about
lesbians and gay men abound in American society. Examples of such
stereotypes include that gay people desire and attempt to molest young
children .. "),rev'd in part and vacated in part, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
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C. The Progressive ComparativeArgument Advances a Thin
Vision of Tolerance and Inclusion
The progressive comparative argument is normatively
undesirable because it advances a decidedly thin vision of
tolerance, one which does not necessarily promote a robust
norm of inclusion in our liberal democratic state. To say
that sexual minorities deserve the right to marry because
all the bad heterosexuals already have that right is surely
not the most effective way to achieve inclusion-to say
nothing of true equality. If anything, the claim that sexual
minorities should be able to marry because even sex
offenders can, signals to others that sexual minorities
should be tolerated not because same-sex marriage
contributes to society in any positive or salutary way but
rather because we already tolerate those who likely disgust
us even more.
The thin vision of tolerance that the progressive
comparative argument projects invites us to consider more
generally what tolerance has come to mean in a liberal
democracy such as ours. In her illuminating study of
tolerance in contemporary American politics and social
movements, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of
Identity and Empire, Professor Wendy Brown has revealed
the dark underside of tolerance discourse and tolerance
politics in a number of different political and social
contexts, from the War on Terror to the struggle for gay
rights. 105 Brown observes, for instance, that
tolerance involves neither neutrality toward nor respect for that
which is being tolerated. Rather, tolerance checks an attitude or
condition of disapproval, disdain, or revulsion with a particular
kind of overcoming-one that is enabled either by the fortitude to
throw off the danger or by the capaciousness to incorporate it or
license its existence.106

Far from a wholesale rejection of the very notion of disgust
as an emotion that is somehow incompatible with liberal
democratic norms, tolerance represents an accommodation
of that which disgusts or repulses us. As Brown nicely puts
105. WENDY BROWN, REGULATING AVERSION: TOLERANCE IN THE AGE OF
IDENTITY AND EMPIRE (2006).

106. Id. at 26.
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it, tolerance "provides a gracious way of allowing one's
tastes to be violated." 10 7 In other words, tolerance and
revulsion go hand in hand in our liberal democratic order.
Liberal tolerance discourse encourages us to tolerate, rather
than to reject, that which disgusts us. In turn, that same
liberal discourse of tolerance, which signals that we are
merely "tolerating" or enduring a foreign element, reinforces
the idea that "something contaminating or dangerous is at
hand, or something foreign is in issue. '108 She writes:
"[t]olerated individuals will always be those who deviate
from the norm, never those who uphold it, but they will also
be further articulated as (deviant) individuals through the
very discourse of tolerance."'10 9
In Part II, this Essay suggested that one explanation
for the progressive comparative argument is that it is
doctrinally motivated. Specifically, the progressive comparative
argument represents a way for marriage progressives to
show that same-sex couples are unlike the bad
heterosexuals who already have the right to marry and
more like-or, in doctrinal terms, more similarly-situated
to--the very best heterosexuals who really deserve that
right. Under this view, marriage progressives are not
necessarily asking society to tolerate sexual minorities/
same-sex couples. Rather, they are asking society to give
sexual minorities/same-sex couples, as good, upstanding
citizens, what they really deserve and what is constitutionally
required, namely, an evenhanded distribution of the marital
right. Moreover, and as Part II also suggested, it could be
that marriage progressives are using an idiom of disgust to
make that doctrinal argument either because: (1) they are
appropriating, whether deliberately or not, the rhetorical
gestures of marriage conservatives in order better to
persuade them (the rhetorical explanation); or (2) the idiom
of disgust is a universal and persistent feature of all social
and political movements, something to which even
progressives will "inevitably" be drawn in the struggle for
equality (the "conservation of disgust" explanation). 110
107. Id. at 25.
108. Id. at 27.
109. Id. at 44.
110. See Kahan, supra note 85, at 64 ("Although the objects of disgust vary
across places and times, all societies inevitably make use of disgust to inform
their judgments of high and low, worthy and unworthy.").
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While the progressive comparative argument might be
explained as an attempt on the part of marriage
progressives to persuade marriage conservatives that samesex couples are unlike the bad people who already can get
married, its ultimate effect, I think, is to issue a plea for
toleration: tolerate us because you already tolerate
something-or someone-far worse, and far more repulsive,
than us. When viewed in this light, the progressive
comparative argument nicely encapsulates Brown's tolerance
thesis, that is, the claim that liberal tolerance discourse not
only contains disgust but also reinforces it. Indeed, to say
that sexual minorities deserve equal marital rights because
a whole host of contemptible figures already do is not to say
that sexual minorities deserve equal rights because they do
not repulse us. Rather, it is to say that sexual minorities
deserve equal rights in spite of the fact that they might, or
do, repulse us.
CONCLUSION

The primary objective of this Essay has been to consider
the reasons for, and the wisdom of, a discrete rhetorical
phenomenon, namely, the rise of the progressive comparative
argument in the legal discourse surrounding marriage
equality. While perhaps narrow in scope, this Essay has
much broader legal implications and applications. From a
theoretical standpoint, it has confirmed Miller and Kahan's
theses that an idiom of disgust is not the exclusive
handmaiden of conservatives and reactionaries, as well as
Brown's thesis that revulsion sits .at the heart of liberal
tolerance discourse. Moreover, it has provided an
alternative context in which to situate and understand the
concept of rhetorical mimicry, something which is often
viewed in negative terms vis-A-vis the push for marriage
equality. From a strategic litigation perspective, this Essay
offers a moment for marriage progressives to revisit the
rhetorical strategies that they have deployed in the struggle
for equal rights and to question whether those strategies
best promote the goal of inclusion that same-sex couples
undoubtedly deserve.

